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Re: procedure for penalizing or revoking CNA status?
On Thu, 25 Sep 2014, jericho wrote:
> For the rest of the board, there has been an increasing reason to better
> monitor and restict CVE assignment. Both from researchers requesting them,
> and from CNAs who don't understand CVE or the abstraction process.
The former issue - about researchers requesting CVEs - is separable from
how CNAs manage CVEs. I will address the latter here. (For the former,
the increasing variety of researcher skill levels, combined with our
desire to minimize access to 0-day information, currently allows certain
issues to go undetected during reservation. We have been aware of this
and related problems, and our CNA team will be developing various
strategies to minimize such errors.)
Some context for CNA-related errors: traditionally, we've had
approximately a 0.5% REJECT rate for CVEs overall, but that percentage has
gone up in recent years, although I don't track these stats regularly or
precisely (yet). While I personally dislike REJECTs, the 0.5% rate
doesn't indicate a systemic problem. But since the raw number of CVE
assignments has also risen along with the rate, the raw number of REJECTs
has increased noticeably. REJECTs, for us and I believe for many CVE
consumers, can cause confusion and be time-consuming to resolve.
We do not have any formal procedures for warning, penalizing, and/or
revoking CNA status, but we agree that we should develop some. One issue
is that things have gotten much more complex, and what might appear to be
a CNA error could in fact be due to limitations of the CNA process, many
of which were discussed in the early days of CVE, if I recall correctly.
When developing procedures, we also need to ensure that any disciplinary
measures - when necessary - are not out of balance with the offense.
However, we also need to be clear on what is causing the errors. The
errors that occur are rarely due to carelesness. For example, we've
learned that over time, people's jobs (naturally) shift; and the original
technical lead for a CNA might move to a different role, and the
replacement is not as well-trained. As another example, there are
researchers who contact multiple CNAs for CVEs and effectively introduce
duplicates that way (not maliciously, as far as I can tell); many
researchers, especially those new to the industry, don't really understand
how CVE works, and are not necessarily diligent in reading our fairly
extensive documentation. As a third example, the significant media
attention and urgency given to some issues, along with non-coordinated
disclosure, introduces room for error. Incomplete *disclosure*
coordination happened with both Heartbleed and Shellshock, and was a
factor in the confusion - for which CVE was a symptom and not a cause
(and, partially, a cure because we did REJECTs pretty quickly.) There are
many more situations besides these.
These types of errors become more pronounced when dealing with higher
volumes of CVEs, with more and more people communicating using CVE, since
the "network" of CVE-speaking parties effectively becomes more complex.
In the coming months, we will improve our tracking for REJECTs and why
they happen; consult more closely with CNAs; and consult with the Board on
ways forward.
- Steve